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HIS, HERS OR OURS? - WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO
DETERMINE THE DISPOSITION OF FROZEN EMBRYOS
AFTER SEPARATION OR DIVORCE?
BY APRIL J. WALKER*

I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of ownership of embryos after divorce was
recently raised again during the Texas divorce trial in the case
Roman v. Roman when Mr. and Mrs. Roman's mediated settlement
agreement failed to cover the couple's embryos.' Although there
have been a few cases in varying state jurisdictions across the
United States dealing with the general issue of the disposition of
frozen embryos at the time of divorce or separation of a couple, all
of these cases have varying facts; and as such, do not provide a
bright line basis to assist the decision in Roman as it proceeds to
the Texas Supreme Court. Certainly, when a couple is in love and
experiencing hopes of becoming new parents together, they are not
thinking of written agreements and the disposition of frozen
embryos when the couple splits and go their own separate ways.
The Roman case has, once again, brought attention to the issue of
whose right is greater - an individual's right not to be a parent, an
individual's right to be a parent or an embryo's right to life. If the
individual who no longer desires to become a parent has a greater
right, does this right outweigh the right of the individual who
desires to become a parent when that individual has no other
options? If the individual who no longer desires to become a
parent has a greater right, does this right outweigh the right of the
embryo to have a chance at life? From a viability standpoint, the
answer to this question may change due to recent changes in the

*The author is an Assistant Professor at Thurgood Marshall School
of Law at
Texas Southern University in Houston, Texas. Professor Walker is also an
associate judge with the City of Houston Municipal Court System.
1Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 42 (Tex. App. 2006).
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composition of the Supreme Court; and may impact the issue of
whether the Roman embryos may be destroyed.2
As such, in this Article the Author will address these issues
and conduct a comparative analysis of how various international
states establish ownership of embryos after separation and divorce
of the parties.
II.

EMBRYOS AND THE IN VITRO FERTILIZATION PROCESS

Many couples, married and unmarried, suffer the problem
of an inability to conceive a child. These problems stem from
various sources such as problems with a woman's fallopian tubes
contributing to an inability to fertilize or an inability to allow
fertilized ova to travel to the uterus; problems with the uterus
contributing to an inability to carry the embryo throughout the
entire gestational period; endometriosis, cervical problems;
infertility and low sperm count.3 Although the success rate is low,4
couples avoid these problems by using the process of in vitro
fertilization ("IVF"), which bypasses the natural place of
fertilization - the fallopian tube.' Louise Brown, the first child
successfully conceived through IVF was born in the United
Kingdom in 1978.6 The first IVF center opened in the United
States in 198 . Since that time, it is estimated that approximately
80,000 women are artificially inseminated each year.
2 See

Jayne A. Major, Ph.D., Parents Who Have Successfully Fought Parental

Alienation Syndrome, http://www.breakthroughparenting.com/PAS.htm
visited Jan. 14, 2006).

(last

3 BARRY R. FURROW, ET AL, BIOETHICS: HEALTHCARE LAW AND ETHICS (4th

ed. 2001).

4 LAWRENCE

J.

KAPLAN

&

ROSEMARIE

TONG, CONTROLLING
OUR
REPRODUCTIVE DESTINY: A TECHNOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

265 (1996) (noting that the IVF process has a successful birth rate of
approximately 20 percent).
5 JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 97-98 (1994).
6 SIR ZELMAN COWEN, REFLECTIONS ON MEDICINE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
THE

LAW 32, 34 (1986).
7 Alise R. Panitch, Note, The Davis Dilemma: How to Prevent Battles Over

Frozen Preembryos, 41 CASE W. RES. 543, 546 (1991).

8 MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, ET AL., THE RIGHT OF FAMILIES

304 (1996).
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During the IVF process, ova or oocytes are removed from
the follicles of a woman's ovaries and fertilized in a laboratory
using the husband's or donor's sperm. After the ova or oocytes are
fertilized with the sperm, they are transformed into embryos. Then
the embryos may be transferred to the uterus of the potential
mother and a viable pregnancy may occur.9 The IVF procedure
frequently produces more embryos than may be safely transferred
to a woman's uterus at one time.
As such, an enhanced method of IVF was developed
allowing the extra embryos to be frozen for future use.' ° This
process is called cryopreservation."
Because of the invasive,
physically difficult 12 and costly nature of the process of removal of
the eggs, cryopreservation is preferred because it allows doctors to
remove a larger amount of eggs at one time than are realistically
contemplated in an effort to reduce the need to repeat the process
again in the future.13 The first child born from this enhanced
cryopreservation IVF process was Zoe, born in Australia in 1984.14
Because the modem divorce rates are high, sometimes
couples divorce before the embryos can be implanted. 5 Even if the
9 See Panitch, supra note 7, at 547
1° Id.
1Id
12 See Georgia Reproductive Specialists, Risks
of Therapy, available at
http://www.ivf.com/overview.html. (noting that the IVF process may cause
women to suffer allergic reactions, hyperstimulation of the ovaries, bruising,
swelling tenderness or infections of the injection site, temporary cessation of
kidney function arterial and venous thrombosis, excessive fluid retention, stroke,
embolism, ovary eruption, reactions from anesthesia, bleeding, internal scarring
and death.).
13National Legal Research Group, Inc., Recent Case Law on Division
of Frozen
Embryos
in
Divorce
Proceedings
available
at
http://www.divorcesource.com/research/dl/children/03mar54.shtml (last visited
July 28, 2007). See also, Gwen Mayes, J.D., "Wait a Minute, I've Changed My
Mind" - Finding the Right Time to Determine the Disposition of Frozen
Embryos, Medscape from WebMD: Ob/Gyn & Women's Health (July 25,
2005), available at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/50855_print (last
visited July 28, 2007).
14FirstBaby Born of Frozen Embryo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
11, 1984 at A 16.
15 See e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.); Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d
554, 673 NY.S.2d 350 (1998); A.Z. v. B.Z., 431 Mass. 150, 725 N.E.2d 1051
(2000); and Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So.2d 465 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).
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parties agreed on the disposition of their frozen embryos at the
time they began the IVF process, those intentions often change
during the separation or divorce process. 6 As such, the parties
face very complex legal, ethical and moral decisions. 7 Many of
these decisions were exponentially more complex because the
parties failed to put their future intentions in writing. However, in
recent years, cryopreservation facilities often require the parties to
sign agreements setting forth the disposition of the embryos if the
parties decide they are no longer willing to go through with the
process or in the event of death or divorce.'" The problem occurs
when the parties' agreement is not recognized, i.e., due to public
policy concerns, in community property states where the embryos
are considered community property or when the parties have no
agreement at all.' 9 Courts have ultimately resolved these problems
by determining who has a greater right to be protected - the party
who desires to become a parent; the parent who does not wish to
parent or the embryo/potential child.
III. How

INTERNATIONAL STATES ESTABLISH OWNERSHIP IN

FROZEN EMBRYOS

Not many states in the United States have enacted statutes
providing the applicable law to use to determine the ownership
and/or disposition of frozen embryos.2" However, IVF is regulated
16

See Mayes, supranote 13.

17 id.
18 Marysol Rosado, Sign on the Dotted Line:

Enforceability of Signed
Agreements, upon Divorce of the Married Couple, Concerning the Disposition
of Their Frozen Embryos, 36 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1041, 1050, 1052, 1055 (2002)
(pointing out that IVF clinics are now requiring couples to sign agreements that
outline the couples' wishes regarding disposition of the preembryos in the event
of separation, divorce or death).
'9 See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057-1058; and Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at
604.
20 Only three states have enacted statutes that deal with the disposition
of frozen
embryos. (1) The Florida legislature enacted FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West
1997) that mandates couples to execute written agreements to set forth the
disposition of frozen embryos in the event of death, separation or divorce.
These agreements must be executed prior to going through the IVF process. If
the couple fails to execute a written agreement, each party is awarded joint
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by legislation in Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark,
Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the
United Kingdom.21 Storage of embryos is allowed in all of these
In
international states except Germany and Switzerland. 22
Germany and Switzerland, no more than three embryos may be
created in one cycle and must be implanted together immediately.23
In Italy, freezing embryos is permitted, however, only in
exceptional cases.24 In most of these countries there is primary
legislation mandating that either party may freely withdraw his or
her consent at any stage of the process up to the moment that the
embryos are implanted.25 In Hungary however, if there is no
specific agreement to the contrary, the woman is entitled to
proceed with implantation even in the event of death of her partner
or divorce.26 In Austria and Estonia the man may withdraw his
consent only up to the point of fertilization, after which, the
woman alone decides if and when implantation will occur.27 In
Spain, the man's right to withdraw his consent is recognized only
if he is married to and living with the woman.28 In Germany and
Italy, neither party may withdraw consent after the eggs have been
fertilized. In Iceland, in the event of separation or divorce, the
embryos must be destroyed.3"
authority regarding the disposition of the frozen embryos. (2) LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9.122-23, 9:126, 9.133 (West 1991) states that an embryo is categorized
as a juridical person that may only be implanted. As such, the parties'

agreement may only provide for implantation and no other disposition is
allowed. (3) N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 168-B-13 - 15 and 168-B-18 (2001)
requires couples to receive counseling and only allows the embryos to be stored
outside of the body for 14 days.
21 Evans v. United Kingdom, 22 BHRC 190,
39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007).
22
Id. at 40.
23 Id. at 41.
24
Id. at 42.
25 Id.
26 id.
27

id.

28

id.

29 id.

30 Id.
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More specifically, in 1990, the U.K. enacted the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act ("HFEA"). 3" Under the HFEA,
the donors must consent in writing to the disposition of frozen
embryos.32 If one party does not consent to implantation, the
embryos will be destroyed after the statutory 5-year minimum
storage period without the consent of either party.33 A similar
statute, the Human Reproductive Technology Act, has been
enacted in Western Australia.34 The Ontario legislature has also
enacted similar legislation, which requires the donors to agree in
advance about the future disposition of the embryos in the event of
a dispute or death.35
Because of the lack of legislation in the United States
governing the disposition of frozen embryos, courts have been left
These decisions
with the job of deciding for the parties.
ultimately boil down to balancing "the right to procreate and the
right not to procreate."37 These two rights conflict one with the
other. In many instances, courts reveal that the questions presented
by these cases are questions of first impression.38

31

Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37 (Eng.), ("HEFA").

32 Id.
33 id.

34 See

HUMAN

REPRODUCTIVE

26(l)(A)(1) (W. Austl.).

TECHNOLOGY ACT,

1991,

§§ 22(4) AND

See B. Dickens, Canada: The Ontario Law Reform Commission's Project on
Human Artificial Reproduction, in LAW REFORM AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION
47, 69 recommendation 27 (Shelia A. M. McLean ed., 1992); see also LAW
REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, MEDICALLY ASSISTED PROCREATION 167
recommendation 5(1) (1992).
36 Evans, 22 BHRC 190 at 43.
37 Joseph Russell Falasco, Frozen Embryos and Gamete Provider's Rights: A
Suggested Model for Embryo Disposition, JURIMETRICS JOURNAL, Spring 2005,
at 276.
38 A. Z. v. B. Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1055 (noting that there is a small amount of law
dealing with the enforceability of agreements concerning the disposition of
frozen embryos. At the time of the A.Z. v. B.Z. decision, only two state courts of
last resort had dealt with the enforceability of agreements regarding the
disposition of frozen embryos).
31
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A. CASES FAVORING THE RIGHT NOT TO PROCREATE
Some scholars believe that the right not to procreate should
39
receive a higher degree of protection than the right to procreate.
Support for this position has been provided by most of the courts
that have handed down decisions regarding the disposition of
frozen embryos.
1. UNITED STATES

a. A.Z. v. B.Z. - Decided March 31, 2000
Contract Favoring Right to Procreate Held Unenforceable
The Massachusetts supremecourt dealt with the first
impression issue of the effect of a consent form executed by A.Z.
and B.Z. concerning the disposition of their frozen embryos."n
Husband, A.Z. and wife, B.Z. were married in 1977.41 Both parties
were in the military at the time of their marriage and resided in
Virginia for the first two years.42 While in Virginia, the parties
discovered that they would encounter difficulties conceiving a
child. 4 3 The wife received fertility testing and did, in fact, become
pregnant. 4 However, the pregnancy resulted in an ectopic eruption
requiring the wife's fallopian tube to be surgically removed. 45 In
1980, the husband and wife moved to Maryland where they
received additional fertility treatments.46 In 1988, the wife's
military unit transferred her to Massachusetts.47 The husband
remained in Maryland.48 The wife began to receive Gamete Inter-

39 Falasco, supra note 37, at 278 (noting that an individual who desires not to

p0rocreate incurs irredressible harm if implantation results in a birth.).
A. Z. v. B. Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1052.
41 id.
42

id.

43 Id.

44Id.
45 Id.
46

Id.

47 Id.
48

Id.
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Fallopian Transfer (GIFT) treatments at a clinic in Massachusetts.4 9

At this time, the husband traveled back and forth from Maryland to
Massachusetts for these procedures.5 ° In 1988, the wife again
became pregnant and again suffered an ectopic eruption requiring
surgical removal of her remaining fallopian tube. 1 Between 1988
and 1991, the wife received IVF treatment.52 The clinic required
patients (both the egg and sperm donors) to execute consent forms
prior to receiving treatment.53 Each time prior to removal of eggs
from the wife, the clinic required the husband and wife to sign preprinted consent forms concerning the future disposition of the
frozen embryos if, among other contingencies, the parties
"separated" or died.54 Under the contingencies, the consent form
provided the following options: donation or destruction. 5 A blank
line was inserted beneath these two options permitting the donor to
write in additional choices for the ultimate disposition of the
embryos.56 Because the parties lived in different states, the
husband always signed a blank consent form.57 The wife would

then complete her portion of the form and fill in the information on
the blank line regarding the future disposition of the frozen
embryos.5 ' Regarding the disposition, the pre-printed form
provided the option "should we become separated " The wife then
crossed out the options for donation or destruction and indicated
on the blank line that the embryos were to be returned to the wife
for implantation.59 As a result of IVF treatment the wife received

Id. The GIFT process requires eggs to be removed from the women, which
are then transferred into the fallopian tube simultaneously with sperm.
Fertilization occurs in the fallopian tube before the embryo is implanted in the
uterus.
50
Id. at 1053.
51 id.
49

52

Id.

53

id..

54

Id. at 1053-54.

55 Id.
56

Id.

57 Id.
58

Id.

59 Id.
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In 1991, the husband moved to
in 1991, she conceived.6"
6
Massachusetts and in 1992, the wife gave birth to twin daughters. "
The 1991 IVF treatment produced more embryos than were
necessary for implantation.6 2 As such, two vials of embryos were
frozen to be used for possible future implantation. In the Spring of
63
1995, the wife expressed her desire to have more children.
Without informing her husband, the wife had one of the vials of
64 The
embryos thawed and one of the embryos was implanted.
husband was notified of the wife's actions when he received a
notice from his health insurance company.65 This caused strife in
the relationship.66 The wife received a protective order against the
husband.67 The husband and wife separated and the husband filed
for divorce.68 There was one vial containing four frozen embryos
69
remaining at the clinic at the time of the divorce proceedings. Of
course, the court had to determine which party had the right to
determine the future of the embryos.
The trial court determined that the consent agreement was
unenforceable because the parties' circumstances changed during
the four years after the husband and wife signed the 1991 consent
agreement.7" In this regard, the court noted that the parties gave
birth to twin daughters, the wife obtained a protective order against
the husband and the husband filed for divorce.7' In the absence of
a "binding agreement," the trial judge determined that it was best
to balance the wife's interest in procreation against the husband's
interest in not being forced to procreate.72 The trial judge held that
the husband's interest in not being forced to procreate outweighed
60

Id. at 1053.

61 id.

62 id.
63 id.

64 Id.
65 id.
66

Id.

67 id.
68 Id.
69 id.
70

Id. at 1054.
71 Id. at 1054-55.
72

Id. at 1055.
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the wife's interest in having additional children and granted a
permanent injunction forbidding the wife from using the embryos
for implantation.73
On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Court determined
that the consent form should not be enforced for four reasons: (1)
the primary purpose of the consent form was to inform the patients
and to define the parties' relationship rather than to act as the
husband and wife's binding agreement; (2) the consent form did
not contain a duration of time during which the agreement was to
be enforceable; (3) the consent form only directed the disposition
of the embryos in the event of the "separation" of the husband and
wife and made no disposition in the event of "divorce"; (4) the
consent form was not a separation agreement that would be
binding on the couple during the divorce proceedings because
there were no provisions for custody, support or maintenance.74
The Massachusetts supreme court went on to state that even if the
husband and wife had entered into an unambiguous agreement, it
still would not enforce it because, as a matter of public policy, the
court could not compel an individual into procreation.75
Prior to the A.Z v. B.Z. case, two other cases in the United
States with similar facts ended in upholding the right to avoid
procreation. After A. Z v. B.Z, in Roman v. Roman, the trial court
awarded frozen embryos to the wife.76 The court of appeals
reversed this decision.77
b. Roman v. Roman - Decided February 9, 2006 - Texas
Court of Appeals Enforcing Contract to Destroy Embryos
after Divorce
Augusta and Randy Roman were married on July 5, 1997.78
Augusta and Randy had trouble conceiving a child.79 In August of
73 Id.

74

75
76

Id. at 1056-57.
Id at 1058.
Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 42 (Tex. App. 2006).

77 id.

78id.
79 Id.
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2001, the Roman's met with a doctor at a reproductive medicine
clinic." The doctor recommended that the Roman's try IVF. On
March 27, 2002, the Roman's signed many documents including a
document entitled "Informed Consent for Cryopreservation of
Embryos.",8' This document authorized the clinic to freeze and
store the embryos until the appropriate time arrived to implant the
embryos. 82 In addition, this agreement set forth that the parties
would discard the embryos in the event of divorce. 83 The
agreement also allowed either party to withdraw their consent to
proceed with the process at any time.84 On April 17, 2002, the
doctor took thirteen eggs from Augusta's ovaries.85 From this
process, six embryos were formed.86 Three of the six embryos
reached a successful stage of development. 87 Augusta was
scheduled for implantation on April 20, 2002.88 However, the
night before the scheduled implantation process, Randy notified
Augusta that he wished to withdraw his consent to proceed with
the April 20 implantation and the Roman's decided to wait. One
month later the parties signed an agreement to unfreeze and
implant the three embryos.9 ° The agreement required the Roman's
to undergo counseling prior to implantation, however the Roman's
never completed the required counseling and the implantation
never took place.9
On December 10, 2002, Randy filed a divorce petition in
the 3 1 0 th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas in
Houston.9 2 The Roman's entered into a mediated settlement
agreement that disposed of their marital property, however, they
80 id.
81

1d.

82
83

Id.
id.

84

Id.

85 Id.
86 Id.
88

Id.
Id.

89

Id.

90

Id.
Id. at 43.

87

91

92 Id.
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failed to include the disposition of the frozen embryos.93 It is not
clear if the parties forgot to include the frozen embryos or if they
believed the disposition of the frozen embryos was covered by the
prior consent agreement.94 During the divorce trial, Randy
requested that the court enforce the prior consent agreement
allowing the frozen embryos to be discarded.95 Augusta, on the
other hand, requested the court award the frozen embryos to her so
that she could have an opportunity to have a biological child.96 In
this regard, Augusta asserted that she would release Randy from
any parental rights or obligations.97 The trial court awarded the
frozen embryos to Augusta.9" Trial court found that (1) the frozen
embryos were created as a result of eggs from August and sperm
from Randy; (2) the parties entered into a mediated settlement
agreement that disposed of all of the parties' community property
except the frozen embryos (3) the frozen embryos were community
property (4) the court considered all evidence in balancing the
constitutional rights of both parties. 99 The trial court concluded
that it has jurisdiction to divide the parties' community property
and awarding the frozen embryos to Augusta was100 a fair and
equitable division of the parties' community property.
On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals noted that this was a
case of first impression that would be resolved by answering the
issue as narrowly as possible anticipating future legislative
involvement." 1 The Court of Appeals noted that no other Texas
courts have decided whether IVF clinic consent agreements are
enforceable. 0 2 Randy argued that other state courts have held such
agreements valid and enforceable while Augusta argued that other
state courts have held such agreements to be invalid.'0 3 After
93 id.

94 Id.

95 id.
96 id.
97 Id.

98 Id.
99 Id.

100 Id
'o' Id. at 44.

o Id. at 45.
'0 3 Id. at 43.
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reviewing the small amount of case law available in this country,
the court determined that the majority view is that written embryo
consent agreements are valid and enforceable as long as the parties
have an opportunity to withdraw consent.1 °4 Then the court looked
to Texas public policy and found that the Texas Uniform Parentage
Act covers assisted reproduction agreements.1"5 This statute
provides that both the husband and the wife must consent to
assisted reproduction, however, a child may be born without the
husband's consent. 10 6 The statute further provides that if a
marriage is dissolved before the embryos are implanted, the former
spouse will not be deemed the parent of the child. 0 7 However, the
statute is silent as to the determination of the disposition of the
embryos in the event of divorce." 8 All-in-all, the court determined
that Texas public policy would allow a husband and wife to
voluntarily enter into an agreement prior to implantation of frozen
embryos that would deal with the disposition of the embryos in the
event of divorce or separation.'0 9 With that said, the court used
regular contract law to determine the validity of the consent
agreement entered into by Augusta and Randy Roman.'10 The
court determined that the agreement clearly provided that the
embryos should be destroyed if the parties divorced prior to
implantation."1
Interestingly, Augusta testified that she
understood the embryo agreement to apply to remaining embryos
12
only after the implantation process."

'4 Id. at 48.
See id at 48-49, citing TEX. FAM. CODE

105

and
§§ 160.751 - 160.763.
106 Id. at 48.
1107d. at 49.
108 Id.
"0 9 Id. at 49 - 50.
"° Id. at50.
II Id. 52.
i2Id.at 52.

§§

160.701-160.707 (Vernon 2002)
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a. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990
In July of 1982, the government of the United Kingdom
appointed a Committee of Inquiry to consider ethical, scientific,
medical and legal issues surrounding the area of fertilization and
embryology.113 The Chairman of the Committee was philosopher,
The Warnock Committee
Dame Mary Warnock, DBE." 4
recognized that many problems could arise as a result of prolonged
storage of embryos and recommended that couples should be
allowed to store embryos for their own future use for a maximum
of ten years and after that time, the right of use or disposal would
pass to the storage clinic." 5 The Warnock Committee further
recommended that, in the event of marital or relationship
breakdown when a couple fails to agree on the disposition of the
frozen embryos, the right to determine the disposition of the frozen
embryos would pass to the storage clinic." 6 The Warnock Report
recommended that embryos could only be harvested and stored
after the clinic obtained written consent from the donors giving the
donors the right to withdraw their consent prior to use." 7 After
further study of the Warnock Committee, "the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology" Bill of 1989 was published and passed into law
as the "Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990."' The
Act allowed storage of frozen embryos for a period not to exceed
five years." 9 "This provision was amended by the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology (Statutory Storage Period for
Embryos) Regulations of 1996," which was enacted on May 1,
1996 to extend the storage period until the woman reaches the age
of 55 with the consent in writing of both donors. 2 ° Furthermore,
11'
Evans, 22 BHRC 190 at

114 id.

5
"l1d
at
116

id.

7

30.

Id. at 31.
" 98 1d. at 33.
" Id at 36.
11

120id.

29.
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the Act required storage clinics to be licensed and licensing was
21
The
conditioned on the clinic's use of the consent agreements.
consent must be given in writing and must specify the maximum
period of storage. 2 2 Prior to giving consent, the donor must be
be
given an opportunity to receive suitable counseling and must
23
consent.
of
withdrawal
or
variation
of
effect
the
advised of
b. Evans v. United Kingdom - Enforcing Agreement
Allowing Withdrawal of Consent
Approximately at or slightly before the year 1995, Natalie
Evans was married and learned that she had difficulty conceiving a
child. 124 At that time, she was referred to the Bath Assisted
Conception Clinic in England. 25 However, because of the breakup
of her marriage, Natalie did not pursue the clinic's services at that
time. 126 On July 12, 2000, Natalie Evans and her boyfriend,
Howard Johnson initiated at the Bath Assisted Conception Clinic
in England. 127 On October 10, 2000, medical staff at the clinic
informed Natalie that preliminary tests indicated that she had precancerous tumors on both of her ovaries. 12 At the time of the visit,
Natalie was advised that because the tumors were growing slowly,
it would be possible for her to have some of her eggs extracted to
be used for IVF. 129 Pursuant to the "Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act of 1990," the clinic was required to have patients
sign consent forms prior to harvesting eggs for the IVF process. 3 °
With only moments to think, Natalie and Howard signed the
consent forms, in which they agreed that either party could
121

Id. at 37.

122 Id.
123 id.

124Id. at
125 Id. at

13.

13.
126 Id. at 13.
127 Id. at
13; see also, Woman Loses Frozen Embryo Battle, CNN.com, March
7, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/03/07/embryos.ruling/index.html,
(Last visited May 21, 2007).
128 Evans, 22 BHRC 190. at
14.
29
1

id.
13°Id. at

15.
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withdraw his or her consent at any time prior to implantation of the
embryos.'31 Natalie asked about freezing her unfertilized eggs (and
in the event that Howard changed his mind, she could possibly
have her eggs fertilized by another sperm donor); however, this
procedure was not performed at the clinic. 3 2 At this time, Howard
reassured Natalie that she did not have to worry about freezing her
eggs because they were not going to split up and he wanted to be
the father of her child. 33 Both Natalie and Howard signed the
consent forms.'34 On November 12, 2001, eleven eggs were
harvested resulting in six embryos.' 35 On November 26, 2001,
Natalie underwent surgery to remove her ovaries. Natalie was
advised that she should wait two years before attempting to
implant the embryos. 3 6 In May of 2002, Natalie and Howard's
relationship broke down and on July 4, 2002, Howard wrote to
clinic and advised of his desire to withdraw consent to allowing the
embryos to be implanted and requested that the embryos be
destroyed.'37 The clinic notified Natalie that based on Howard's
position, it had a legal obligation to destroy the embryos. 38
Natalie filed suit seeking an injunction requiring Howard to
restore his consent and a declaration that Howard could not vary
his consent pursuant to the October 10, 2001 consent agreement. 39
Natalie also sought a declaration that §§ 8, 12 and 14 of the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 breached her rights. n
The trial judge held that public policy did not require Howard to
"give an unequivocal consent" allowing Natalie to use the embryos
even if they were no longer together because Howard "only ever
consented to his treatment 'together"' with Natalie. 4 ' The trial
judge further held that "an embryo was not a person with rights
131 id.
132 id.
133 Id.

134 1d. at
1351Id.at
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protected under the Convention, and Natalie's right to respect for
family life was not engaged.' 142 Natalie appealed the trial judge's
decision, however, the "Court of Appeal" agreed with the trial
court and dismissed Natalie's appeal. 143 The Court of Appeal also
denied Natalie's request for leave to appeal the trial judge's finding
that the embryos did not have any independent rights. an Natalie
again appealed to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights.
The Grand Chamber reviewed the history of the
Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 and the laws of other
international states including the United States. In this regard, the
Grand Chamber noted that Article 5 of the Council of Europe
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine states that "an
intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the
person concerned has given free and informed consent" and "the
145
person concerned may freely withdraw consent at any time.',
The Grand Chamber further noted that "Principle 4 of the
principles adopted by the ad hoc committee of experts on progress
in the biomedical sciences ... stated 'the techniques of artificial
procreation may be used only if the persons concerned have given
their free, informed consent, explicitly and in writing, in
accordance with national requirements.", 146 Finally, the Grand
Chamber noted that "Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of
Bioethics and Human Rights provides that 'medical intervention is
only to be carried out with the prior, free and informed consent of
the person concerned, based on adequate information ... and the
consent should be express and may be withdrawn by the person
concerned at any time and for any reason with disadvantage or
prejudice."", 147 The Grand Chamber determined that issue was
"whether there exists a positive obligation on the State to ensure
that a woman who has embarked on treatment for the specific
142
W
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purpose of giving birth to a genetically related child should be
permitted to proceed to implantation of the embryo
notwithstanding the withdrawal of consent by her former partner,
the male" sperm donor.'48 The Grand Chamber held that a positive
obligation does not exist because even though Natalie's
circumstances were exceptional, they did not override a genetic
parent's withdrawal of consent.'49
B. CASES FAVORING PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST DENYING AN
INDIVIDUAL A RIGHT TO ACHIEVE GENETIC PARENTHOOD

The United States Supreme Court has held that a person has
a right to procreate and to be free from governmental intrusion
when making such decisions. 5 ° However, there are no current
cases from courts of last resort in the United States between
husband and wife dealing with the issue of the disposition of
frozen embryos where a party's right to achieve genetic
parenthood has been upheld. However, a court in Israel held that a
woman's right to give birth to a biological51 child outweighs the
sperm donor's right not to become a parent.'
1. ISRAEL - NAHMANI V. NAHMANI - ENFORCING AGREEMENT
ALLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT

Ruth and Daniel Nahmani married in March of 1984.152
Three years after their marriage, Ruth required a surgical
procedure that resulted in her loss of the ability to experience a
normal pregnancy.' 53 The last eggs that Ruthie could ever produce
Eleven eggs were fertilized with Danni
were extracted. 5'
155
The embryos were frozen for future use.' 56
Nahmani's sperm.
1481d.at 58.
149 1d. at 60.
150See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
151See CA 5587/93, Nahmani v. Nahmani [1995] IsrLR I.
152 Nahmani, IsrLR I at 8.
153Id.
154 idY.
155Id.
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57
Ruth Nahmani could not gestate or carry a fetus to term.1 As
such, Ruth would have to undergo IVF with the assistance of a
surrogate mother. Mr. and Mrs. Nahmani sought the services of an
IVF clinic in California, U.S.A.' The Nahmani's determined that
they could not afford the cost of IVF in the United States so they
decided to complete the IVF process in Israel and the surrogacy
process in the United States.159 According to Israel law at the time,
a fertilized embryo could only be implanted in the woman who
would be the mother of the child. 160 As such, the Nahmani's
petitioned the Israel High Court of Justice, which resulted in a
consent judgment on May 6, 1991 which would allow the IVF
procedure to be done notwithstanding the fact that the embryo(s)
would not be implanted in Ruth. 161 The Nahmani's executed a
surrogacy agreement with a clinic in the United States.'6 2 The
Nahmanis contemplated that an embryo transfer agreement would
be signed in the future after the surrogate mother was found.
However, Ruth and Daniel separated. 163 Thereafter, Danni lived
with another woman, with which he had two children. 164 Ruth
requested that the embryos be released to her so that she could65
arrange to the have them implanted in a surrogate mother.
However, Daniel notified the IVF storage clinic in Israel and the
surrogacy clinic in the United States that he refused to agree to
to Ruth. 16 6 Ruth filed a lawsuit to
have the embryos released
67
obtain the embryos.
The trial judge held that Daniel breached his agreement
with his wife reasoning that this situation was no different than
situations when a husband's wife becomes pregnant from

157 Id.
158
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160 Id.,
161
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intercourse.168 The judge held that because Daniel had already
fertilized Ruth's eggs, he could not withdraw his agreement to
169
have a child with Ruth.
A five-judge panel of the Supreme Court of Israel reversed
the decision of the trial court holding that Daniel had a
fundamental right not to be forced to be a parent and that the
agreement was unenforceable because the originally-contemplated
performance was now impossible. 7 ° The five-judge panel further
held that until the embryos were implanted, both Daniel and Ruth's
consent was required at every stage of the IVF process.'
An eleven-judge panel of the Supreme Court reheard the
appeal and reversed the decision of the five-judge panel awarding
the embryos to Ruth. 7 2 The eleven-judge panel found that no
statutes or precedents applied to this case.' 73 The court looked to
laws giving value to life rather than contract law.' 74 The court was
influenced by the fact that Ruth's only chance to become a
biological mother was if the embryos were successfully
implanted.'75 The court quoted the Bible, Genesis 30, 1 where
Rachel said: "give me children or else I die."' 76 The court opined:
Parenthood is a status that involves many rights and duties
which can change the personal status of a person and significantly
influence his life from psychological, emotional and economic
viewpoints.'77
The court also noted that in most countries informed
consent of both donors is required at every stage of the IVF
process.' 78 The court decided that the harm to Ruth outweighed the
harm to Daniel.'7 9
168 Id.
169Id.
170Id.
171 id.
172 id.
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C. RIGHTS OF THE EMBRYO - ARE EMBRYOS
PROPERTY OR PERSONS?

There are three major theories for classification of
embryos: (1) the theory that an embryo is not a life - merely
human tissue; (2) the theory that an embryo is a human life that
should be given a chance to develop through implantation and (3)
the majority theory, which favors the position that an embryo
should be given greater respect than mere human tissue because it
has the potential for life,0however, its classification does not rise to
18
the level of human life.

1. EMBRYO IS NOT A LIFE

In the case Mine. P. c. La Grave Hospital, a wife and
husband's embryos were stored at La Grave Hospital. 8' The
agreement between the couple and La Grave Hospital included
fertilization and implantation and had a specific provision that
required the consent of both the husband and wife prior to
implantation."8 2 Prior to implantation, the husband died and La
Grave Hospital refused to implant the embryos without his
consent. 83 The wife brought suit claiming that the agreement
should be ignored asserting that the embryos were not mere
property because life begins at the moment of conception, i.e.
fertilization of the eggs.8 4 The Court of Appeals at Toulouse held
that French law does not provide frozen embryos with rights and
ordered the embryos destroyed.'85

180 Falasco, supra note 37, at 280.
181

CA Toulouse, Aug, 18, 1994, J.C.P. 1995, II, 224072, 301.
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2. EMBRYO Is A LIFE
Alison Miller and Todd Parrish stored embryos at a fertility
clinic in Chicago, Illinois.'86 Alison and Todd alleged that fertility
clinic destroyed their nine embryos without their consent.'87
Alison and Todd sued the fertility clinic alleging that the fertility
clinic ended the lives of the nine embryos. 88 The fertility clinic
moved to dismiss the suit. 89 In February of 2005, the Illinois trial
judge denied the motion to dismiss the wrongful death suit
explaining that a fetus qualifies as deceased person for the
purposes of Illinois' Wrongful Death Act.'9" The judge stated
further that "a preembryo is a 'human being' . . . whether or not it
is implanted in its mother's womb."'' To support this holding the
Illinois judge cited an Illinois law that specifically provides that
"an unborn child is a human being from the time of conception and
is, therefore, a legal person.' ' 92 Critics of this decision fear the
implications this decision could have on the right to abortion. 193
In addition, the State of Louisiana recognizes the right of
an embryo to develop. According to Louisiana statute, disputes
regarding the disposition of embryos are decided based on the best
interest of the embryos.'94 As such, it would follow that the rights
to the embryos are awarded to the donor who will allow them to
develop.

186

Sherry Colb, Judge Rules Frozen Embryos are People, CNN.Com, Feb. 23,
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3. EMBRYO DOES NOT RISE TO LEVEL OF

LIFE
HUMAN LIFE BUT HAS POTENTIAL FOR

States Supreme
One can draw an inference that the United
holdings allowing a
Court favors the majority theory due to its
the fetus becomes
woman to abort a fetus at any time up until
times, the question
viable. 95 Due to modem technology, in recent
earlier in the
of when viability occurs is becoming earlier and
Sonia Taylor was born
pregnancy. 96 On October 24, 2006, Amillia
197 This is a record in the
21 weeks and 6 days after conception.
98
field of neonatology.'
Although courts in the United States have held that frozen
have been
embryos have the potential for life, frozen embryos
of the
owner
the
classified as property and have even held that
199
embryos and storage facility have a bailor/bailee relationship.
not
Tennessee law specifically indicates that frozen embryos are
persons, however, the Tennessee supreme court has held that
embryos are not property but have the characteristics of
property. 00 Under United States federal law, an embryo is not a
person and at least one federal district court has held that frozen
embryos are property.20 ' It seems to be clear that the rights of the
sperm donors trump any rights that the embryo may
egg and
20 2
have.

195 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973)
Feb.
196 See 21-Week Old Miracle Baby Survives at Baptist Hospital,NBC6.net,
19, 2007, http://www.nbc6.net/hea/ 1056409/detail.html.
197 d.
198 Id.
199 See York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp. 421,424-25 (E.D. Va. 1989).
200 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
at
201 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162; see also York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp.
425.
202 JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 97-98 (1994); see also, Donna
M. Sheinbach, Comment, Examining Disputes Over Ownership Rights to Frozen
Embryos: Will Prior Consent Documents Survive if Challenged by State Law
and/or ConstitutionalPrinciples?, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 989 (1999).
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VI. CONCLUSION: How DOES THE STATE OF THE LAW
AMONG INTERNATIONAL STATES AFFECT THE LIKELY
OUTCOME OF THE ROMAN CASE?

It is true that the cases in the United States tend to fall on
the side of protecting an individual's right not to be forced to
become a parent. However, the facts of the Roman case are
distinguished from the other cases because Augusta Roman has
never been able to achieve conception and she is aging.
In addition, the composition of the United States Supreme
Court has changed and the determination of viability is occurring
earlier and earlier with modem technology. One can draw an
inference that the United States Supreme Court favors the majority
theory due to its holdings allowing a woman to abort a fetus at any
time up until the fetus becomes viable.2" 3 In addition, as stated
above, critics of the Illinois decision defining an embryo as human
life fear the implications this decision could have on the right to
abortion. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade afforded a woman a right to an abortion in the first trimester
of pregnancy when the abortion is performed by medically
competent personnel.2" 4 In other words, until viability occurs, the
fetus is not a person and is not entitled to legal protection.2 5
Viability is defined as the point when a fetus can exist on its
own.20 6 In the Roe decision, Justice Blackmun defined viability to
be the critical point when the state is permitted to protect the fetal
life.20 7 The point of viability is constantly occurring earlier with
the assistance of technological developments. The idea of an
artificial womb will make it possible for an embryo to survive in
vitro from the point of its conception.20 ' Furthermore, the favored

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 113.
Id.
205 Id.
106 Id. at 164.
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of embryos is that they have the potential for
classification
09
human.

2

However, the Texas court of appeals in Roman felt that it
would have to impute words into the Romans' contract that were
not present.210 The court found that the plain language of the
agreement stated "if [the Romans] divorced or either [... ] files for
divorce while any of [their] frozen embryos are still in the
program, [both] hereby authorize.., the frozen embryo(s) shall be
discarded., 211 As such, the court held that the agreement was valid
and enforceable and the trial court should have enforced the
agreement rather than awarding the frozen embryos to Augusta.212
On July 5, 2006, Augusta Roman appealed the decision of the
Texas Court of Appeals to the Texas Supreme Court.213 An amicus
curia brief in support of Augusta Roman was filed by Texas
Physicians Council. 214 However, on August 24, 2007, without
issuing an opinion, the Texas Supreme Court denied Augusta
Roman's petition for review. 215 Augusta will have until September
10, 2007 to file a motion for rehearing.2 16 Texas Physicians
Council argued that Texas statutes establish a long-standing policy
of protecting human life; and for this reason, the agreement
between Randy and Augusta Roman should be declared void as
against public policy. 217 However, the 2007 Texas legislature
amended Section 160.706 of the Texas Family Code to provide:

Falasco, supra note 37, at 280.
Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 52.
211 Id.
212
Id. at 55.
213 See Texas Courts Online - Texas Supreme Court, available at
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilinglD=2735
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215 Court Won't Hear Battle Over Embryos, The New York Times, Aug. 25,
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(Last visited Aug. 27, 2007).
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That if a marriage is dissolved before placement of
eggs, sperm, or embryos, the former spouse is not a
parent of the resulting child unless the former
spouse consented in a record kept by a licensed
physician that if assisted reproduction were to occur
after divorce, the former spouse would be a parent
of the child. Furthermore, the consent of the former
spouse to assist in reproduction may be withdrawn
at any time before placement of the eggs, sperm, or
embryos.21
These amendments seem to be a clear response to the
Roman case. Nevertheless, although it seems that most of the case
law in this country seems to be stacked against August Roman, the
Roman case can be distinguished from these cases because August
Roman has never been able to have any children of her own. In
this regard, Augusta Roman's case is more similar to Ruth
Nahmani's.
In light of the new Texas legislation, this writer does not
expect the Texas Supreme Court to change its mind and grant
Augusta Roman's petition for review. On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, this writer expects Augusta Roman to test
the newly composed United States Court's definition of viability
and assert the rights of her frozen embryos. In addition, this writer
expects Augusta Roman to argue some of the well-researched
analysis of the Israel Supreme Court in the Nahmani case.
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